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Abstract 
Around 80% of the Sub-Saharan African population lives below the $2 a day poverty line, under 
miserable conditions because of armed conflicts, and bad governance. By using private credit as 
a measure of financial development and the poverty gap, as a proxy for poverty, this paper 
studies the impacts of financial sector development on poverty. This paper employs the panel 
data econometric analysis and the results suggest that financial development can contribute to 
poverty alleviation in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1.Poverty in Sub Saharan Africa 
Poverty continues to be the dark subject associated with Africa, particularly Sub Saharan Africa. 
Almost 1 in 2 people in Sub Saharan Africa is poor, and this isn’t surprising in a region marred 
with political conflicts, poor governance systems, terrorism, dictatorships and corruption. In spite 
of all the disheartening statistics and reality, in line with the Millennium Development Goals, in 
Sub-Saharan Africa the extreme poverty rate of $1.25 a day in 1990 quoted in 2005 prices was 
cut by 50% in the year 2010, according to the World Bank 2005 Report. Between 1999 and 2010 
extreme poverty rates in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), dropped by 10%. Similarly in SSA, life 
expectancy at birth has improved significantly from 42.4 years in 1969, to 45.9 years in 2004.  
Infant mortality per 1000 live births has decreased, (149 in the 60’s, to 101 in 2004, to 77 in 
2010 (World Bank, Report; Development Indicators 2005).  
However, SSA countries continue to have the lowest life expectancy in the world compared 
to other regions (United Nations 2004). The number of poor people in SSA has increased 
between the years 1981 and 2010 since twice the number of poor people lives in SSA in 2010 as 
compared to 1981. In 1981 SSA contributed 11% of the world total poor people (World Bank 
2013). For this cause many humanitarian organizations and countries have pumped huge 
amounts of money as donor aid into Africa, to fight the scourge of poverty. The impact of this 
aid money is still open to discussion. Most SSA countries are well over 20 years, but they still 
struggle with poverty to this day, simply because most solutions which are employed are not 
sustainable. Africa needs a sustainable solution applicable even in the poorest of the countries to 
fight poverty. Financial development is proposed in this study as another viable option to poverty 
alleviation, but this of course will have to start with its respective development in SSA countries. 
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1.2.Research Question 
By promoting transactions, the financial sector is an important building block for private sector 
development.  The financial sector plays an important role in reducing risk and vulnerability. 
Besides, the financial sector increases the ability of households to access basic services like 
health and education. To this end, I propose Financial Sector Development (hereafter referred to 
as FSD) as a more possible solution to lessen poverty in SSA. Can financial development help 
fight poverty in SSA even when controlling for foreign aid (net-ODA) and other country specific 
macro-socio-political effects? Can the banks by promoting credit access for the poor, help poor 
households to invest in productive assets that can, boost their incomes in the short and long run? 
1.3.Hypothesis 
Firstly, financial sector development matters and significantly plays a positive and direct role in 
poverty alleviation. Secondly, the impact of financial sector development on poverty alleviation 
outweighs that of net ODA and economic growth. 
1.4.Research Objective 
In this study, I analyze the impacts of FSD on poverty in SSA beyond those of net-ODA and 
economic growth. I admit to the resolve that FSD has a positive impact on poverty alleviation. If 
this holds, then it can cause a great impact on policy reforms in SSA. Governments will prioritize 
FSD, instead of trying to wipe out poverty through seasonal food relief, or donor aid. 
1.5.Contribution to existing literature 
This work contributes to current literature by factoring in the political, social and economic 
context of SSA, and by looking at the impacts of financial development on poverty, beyond the 
contribution of net-ODA and economic growth. Equally, to the best of my knowledge this work 
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includes control variables like remittances and FDI among other variables to check for political 
stability and corruption, variables which haven’t been included in more or less similar studies 
like, Beck, Demirgüç, and Levine 2007, Jeanneney and Kpodar 2008, Jalilian & Kirkpatrick 
2007. Also, this study doesn’t only focus on one FSD measure, but uses three variables against 
two poverty variables, for robustness checks to clearly identify if FSD plays an important role on 
poverty alleviation. 
1.6.Methodology and preliminary Findings 
In using a panel fixed effects estimator with robust standard errors and a panel IV fixed effects 
estimator, with clustered standard errors: First, the results show that financial sector development 
through all its proxy variables has a significant and direct positive impact on poverty alleviation. 
Second, as well as the direct impacts financial sector development reduces poverty significantly, 
even when controlling for economic growth, net ODA and other socio-political country specific 
effects. Third, net ODA was found to be insignificant in the fight against poverty, while in the 
financial sector development was overwhelmingly significant to poverty reduction, giving FSD 
an advantage as a potential tool for poverty alleviation. 
1.7.Research Outline 
The first part of this report will address existing literature surrounding the topic of 
financial development, and its impact on poverty alleviation. Data analysis will follow 
next, as I define the major variables and summary statistics used in this study and their 
significance in defining what they represent. Before the conclusion, we will have the 
results interpretation and the policy implications section as we look at the different results 
stemming from our regressions. 
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2. Literature review 
Financial Development has direct and indirect effects on poverty. Promoting credit access to the 
poor, reducing transaction costs, and promotion of savings explain the direct effects. Impacts of 
financial development on poverty through economic development reflect the indirect effects. The 
literature review, will explain FSD in SSA and the flaws in the financial markets. Further, I’ll 
review the literature on the direct impacts of financial development and poverty and last I’ll look 
at the indirect impacts of financial development on poverty. 
2.1. Financial sector development in Africa. 
The African Development Bank in the Africa Economic Brief 2010
1
, highlights the poor 
financial infrastructure that Africa has in general. The AFDB reports that only 20% of African 
families had bank accounts as of that time. An example is Kenya a leading country in Africa, of 
which just 30% of Kenyans had a bank account in 2012. While Benin a country of 7 million 
people, has only 35 banks. Financial illiteracy, geographical isolation of some communities, and 
deficient infrastructure, contributes to the weak development of the financial sector in SSA.  
Besides, geographical isolation of some communities and deficient infrastructure contribute to 
the high cost of providing financial services to the poor. In most communities, banks have to 
incur huge costs to just open a single branch in some of these remote areas. The AFDB report 
further states, some countries in Africa have as low as one bank branch for every 100000 people 
(case of: Ethiopia, Uganda, and Tanzania) compared with 100 in Spain.  
However, there are disparities in the bank branch distribution across countries as some countries 
like Namibia, Zimbabwe and Botswana have more than four bank branches per 100000 people.  
                                                          
1
Peter Ondiege; The African Development Bank In the Africa Economic Brief Volume 1, Issue 8 of December 2010; 
Mobile Banking in Africa: Taking the Bank to the People. 
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With institutions for deposits (banks) SSA has the lowest average (16.6%) compared with 
the developing countries average (63.5%). In SSA the savings rate has increased significantly 
from 16.1% in January 2002 to 20.38% in January 2014, nevertheless this is a far cry from the 
savings rate recorded in the early 70’s. An all high of roughly 25% savings rate was recorded in 
the early 80’s (Ondiege 2010). 
2.2.Imperfections in the financial sector 
Imperfections in the financial sector, such as asymmetric information, contract enforcement costs 
and transaction costs negatively affects many poor entrepreneurs and families who lack collateral 
security, and enough credit history. Besides, market imperfections can explain persistent poverty 
as some studies have pointed out, Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986). In their paper, Becker and 
Tomes, explain how government policy through taxes and redistribution of wealth can have 
negative effects on the poor in the long run.  These constraints block or negatively affect the 
transfer of capital to poor people, and therefore increasing inequality. Yet with financial sector 
widening, competition between financial intermediaries will address the issue of costs, forcing 
them down and improving on the quality of services provided by these financial institutions. 
2.3.Financial Development and it's direct effects on poverty 
The poor benefit from FSD, through access to credit, improved savings, and risk management. 
Through highlighting investment ideas, overseeing borrowers, exerting corporate control and 
promoting the exchange of goods and services banks help the poor, Levine (1997)
2
. These basic 
roles of the financial sector help to assign financial instruments to suiting individuals. At the 
same time makes sure clients depositing their money in the banks incur a fair return.  
                                                          
2
 (Levine 1997) Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda 
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Pooling savings can enable the poor to amass and access funds in a secure place overtime 
to finance large, expected future spending or investment. Mobilizing savings also creates an 
opportunity for relending the collected funds into the community.  Savings play a huge role in 
economic growth, as they are the chief source of investment capital. In the developing world, 
according to the World Bank SSA has the least savings ratio, when compared with South and 
East Asia which have higher savings ratios (42% from 2008). FSD addresses these problems as it 
creates a free market between savers and investors, by creating a conducive and good 
environment to both camps, hence its importance in fighting poverty in SSA. With investments, 
there is economic growth, employment, capital build-up and an increase wages, all of which 
directly impact on the consumption trends of the poor. Some banks and financial intermediaries 
also go on awareness campaigns teaching people on the benefits of savings, a part that is still 
lacking in most SSA countries.  
Beck (2007)
3
 find in their results that FSD, boosts incomes of the poorest 20% and 
reduces income inequality. The researchers realize drops in income inequality are a result of 
around 40% of the long-run impact of FSD on the growth of incomes of the poorest 20%. On the 
other hand 60% of the impact of financial development on total economic growth explains the 
decline in income inequality.  Also the results reveal that financial development causes a drop in 
the headcount ratio at the $1 poverty line, even when controlling for average growth.  
These findings specify the importance of FSD for the poor. Access to credit to fund income 
giving projects might explain the growth in incomes of the poorest 20%.  
Besides, if the poor can access credit at low cost they can invest in educating their 
children a cost that reaps huge benefits in the long-run. Similarly, since most of the SSA poor 
                                                          
3
 Finance, Inequality and the Poor : Beck, Demirgüç, and Levine 2007 
7 | P a g e  
 
people live in rural areas, growth in incomes can be explained by an improvement in the 
productivity of their agricultural assets. As credit becomes more accessible, poor people can 
invest in productivity improving tools and machinery in their agricultural practices. In turn, the 
increase in productivity may create surplus for these households, the surplus is in turn sold and 
converted into monetary gain. McKinnon (1973) states that poor people in developing countries 
don’t invest their savings. In the same paper McKinnon explains that if the poor were to deposit 
their savings in financial institutions, not only would they earn real rates of return they could also 
amass wealth.  
With an increase in competition in the financial sector, the poor can benefit from access 
to the financial institutions at a lower cost. The poor people can equally cushion themselves 
against future financial shocks, with more access to credit markets. The poor can plan and invest 
notable in education, and better health care.  In developing poor countries the poor have to save 
before they can invest, in so doing poor African countries can become less dependent on external 
debt. Investment will stem from an increase in savings, and for the poor to save more; they need 
financial institutions which will give them value for their savings. Additionally, even if the poor 
were not going to benefit from investment opportunities, they would still benefit from real 
returns on their savings and deposits. Also, McKinnon explains how FSD through better resource 
allocation helps in innovating and adoption of new technology. McKinnon uses an illustration of 
a farmer who cannot afford a particular investment out of his own savings.  
The farmer needs to borrow, to buy some piece of equipment (that is to invest in “new 
technology”) which would increase his productivity, and enable him to earn a higher income 
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(McKinnon 1973)
4
.Therefore, by mobilizing savings, and increasing credit, financial institutions 
promote new investments across the economy. This infers that financial institutions have a 
positive impact on overall productivity in the economy. Caskey (2006) builds on the need for 
poor households to have access to formal financial intermediaries. They do so, by stating the 
extra costs the poor without accessible formal financial intermediaries will have to face and bear. 
In their study, conducted in Mexico and the United States, Caskey (2006), finds the unbanked 
(population without access to banks) pay an extra cost. This extra cost is for transaction costs, 
time and insecurity in not using formal financial intermediaries. They also find that unbanked 
households in Mexico have more home ownership than the unbanked households in the USA.  
This result results in questions on the existence of non-formal institutions of credit used 
by the unbanked in Mexico which do not exist in the USA. Also, unbanked households in both 
countries were characterized by low income and low education levels (Caskey, Duran et Solo 
2006)
5
. Similarly, in SSA since poorer households are in the rural areas, they are already isolated 
from the bank branches which exist mainly in the urban areas. So they have to make-do, with 
unofficial channels of credit. In explaining the informal financial sector, we can also add that it 
develops in response to controls existing in the formal financial intermediaries. Barriers existing 
in the financial sector provide for the possibility of monopolies, by it worsening the plight of the 
poor.  
On informal financial intermediaries in Ghana, Aryeetey (1991), finds that institutional barriers 
and the ease of physical access may explain why households stick to the informal sector for their 
                                                          
4
 McKinnon, Ronald I., Money & Capital in Economic Development, Washington, D.C., the Brookings Institution, 
1973. 
5
 John P. Caskey , Clemente Ruíz Durán, Tova Maria Solo, The Urban Unbanked in Mexico and the United States 
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financial needs (Aryeeetey 1991)
6
. Convincingly, Caskey et al (2006), in their study find that in 
the USA 53 % of the people surveyed didn’t have bank accounts because of the absence of 
savings. While in Mexico, a country rather underdeveloped compared with the USA, had 70% of 
the people saying they didn’t have bank accounts because of the transaction costs (Caskey, 
Duran et Solo 2006). 
With better access to credit, the poor can invest in riskier, yet rewarding investments. 
Credit may also be used to finance investment in education or health, and can thus promote 
increasing human capital (Gregorio 2006)
7
.  Thus, savings mobilization can have a significant 
impact on growth by increasing investment, productivity and human capital. By making more 
capital available to innovators, financial intermediaries that facilitate diversification may also 
increase technological change and thus economic growth and later poverty decrease.  
Credit can strengthen the productive assets of the poor by enabling them to invest in 
productivity-enhancing new ‘technologies’ such as new and better tools, equipment, or fertilizers. 
Also, the poor can invest in education and health, all of which provide for a higher income in 
future. Credit can also be an important cause in creating or expanding small businesses, thus 
producing self-and wage-employment and increasing incomes.  
Expanding the supply of financial services will increase income growth for the poor, therefore 
delivering a direct impact on poverty decrease (Hossein et Colin 2005)8. Further, improved 
access to financial markets may help lessen the vulnerability of the poor to the financial shocks 
they face without savings or insurance. Eswaran and Kotwal argue that just the knowledge that 
                                                          
6
 Aryeetey and Gockel 1991: Mobilizing domestic resources for capital formation in Ghana, The role of Informal 
Financial Sectors. 
7
 José De Gregorio economic growth in Latin America: from the disappointment of the twentieth century to the 
challenges of the twenty-first century 
8
 Hossein Jalilian, Colin Kirkpatrick; Does Financial Development Contribute to Poverty Reduction? 2005 
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credit will be available to cushion consumption against income shocks, can make a household 
more willing to adopt more risky technologies.  These risky investments become the potential 
source of improved productivity and increased incomes for the poor (Kotwal 1990)
9
.  
For the same reason, access to credit and other financial services is likely to decrease the 
proportion of low-risk, low-return assets held by poor households for precautionary purposes. 
Therefore access to credit will enable the poor to invest in potentially higher risk, but higher 
return assets (such as education) (Deaton 1991)
10
. Eswaran and Kotwal add that growth in the 
incomes of the poor and an increase in their individual savings follows economic development. 
Similarly, improvements and expansion to the irrigation techniques follow agrarian development. 
This development lessens the dependency of farmers on weather and afterwards lessening the 
doubt related to rainwater dependency.  
In conclusion Eswaran and Kotwal state improving credit markets can simplify diversifying 
risk across individuals whose consumption trends are not correlated. This results in transferring 
credit from those without any financial problems to those hard hit by financial shocks. 
 
2.4.Financial Sector development and its indirect impacts on poverty 
FSD can also fight poverty indirectly, through its effects on economic growth. Cross-country 
studies show there are significant differences between economic growth and poverty decrease 
across countries. Nonetheless, the incomes of the poor rise (and fall) proportionately with 
average incomes (Aart et David 2001).  As the incomes of the poor increase they spend more on 
consumption and usually in rural Africa, they equally invest in farming equipment. Increasing 
                                                          
9
Mukesh Eswaran and Ashok Kotwal; Implications of Credit Constraints for Risk Behavior in Less Developed 
Countries 
10
 Angus Deaton, Savings and liquidity constraints, Econometrica, Vol. 59, No. 5 (September, 1991), 1221-1248, ,  
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income pushes poor people out of poverty. Unfortunately, because of inequality and 
misallocation of state wealth, the poor remain poor. 
With economic growth, follows job creation, an increase in the general wage level to the 
benefit of poor people.  In SSA joblessness has spread across sectors and geographical divides 
(ILO 2013) and is appalling (7.5% in 2011) compared with the world average (5.89% in 2011), 
and.
11
 Unemployment is high in the rural areas, and higher in the urban areas. This is because of 
growth in the informal sector.  Expectant people flood the cities from the rural areas, with the 
hopes of getting better paying employment opportunities.  
Goldsmith (1969)
12
, using data on 35 countries from 1860 – 1963, found evidence of a 
relationship between economic growth and financial development over long periods. Also, he 
found that periods of rapid economic growth have often been accompanied by an above-average 
rate of financial development (Goldsmith 1969). Further, King and Levine (1993)
13
 using various 
measurements for financial development study 80 countries over the period 1960 – 1989, and 
find evidence of a strong, positive link between financial development and economic growth. In 
their results they find that financial development is strongly associated with real per capita GDP 
growth. Also, they find that financial development is robustly correlated with predicted future 
economic growth rates, physical capital build-up and improvements in economic efficiency 
(Robert et Ross 1993). Levine, et al, in a different study use both cross-sectional data and panel 
data to focus on three measures of financial intermediation (private credit, commercial-central 
bank, liquid liabilities). They do this to capture not only the size of financial institutions, but also 
their credit channeling capacities. They find that financial development has a positive impact on 
                                                          
11
ILO ; Global Employment Trends 2013: Facts and figures for Sub-Saharan Africa, Article | 22 January 2013 
 
12
R. W. GOLDSMITH Financial Structure and Development, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1969 
13
King and Levine (1993)Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might be Right 
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economic growth. Also underlining the impact could be because of the indirect influence of 
financial development on economic growth (Thorsten, Ross et Norman 2000)14. These results 
are also in line with earlier studies by Schumpeter whose results favor the growth-enhancing 
view of financial intermediation ( Schumpeter Joseph 1934)15.  
In conclusion to their study Thorsten, Ross & Norman (2000) state that their findings are 
in line with theoretical models that assume and state that better competitive financial institutions 
accelerate economic growth. Their results stand against models that predict the growth-retarding 
impact of financial development. Finally, they imply that if economists can clearly specify legal, 
and governance related policy reforms that promote financial development, these policies may 
well positively influence economic growth (Thorsten, Ross et Norman 2000).Expectedly, the 
impact of financial development on economic growth is not without critics, who find the positive 
role of financial intermediaries on economic growth small. Calderon and Liu (2003) also adopt 
an innovative econometric technique to analyze this issue, using data on 109 countries for the 
years 1960-1994
16
. Their results show bidirectional cause that is FSD has a causal impact on 
growth, and growth also has a causal impact on FSD. 
  However, the impact of FSD on growth is more important, relative to the impact of 
growth on FSD, particularly in developing countries where it explains 84% of the overall 
relationship over a 10 year period (though also in industrial countries over longer periods, where 
it explains 57% of the relationship over a 10 year period).  This suggests that financial sector 
                                                          
14
 Levine, Loayza & Beck, Financial intermediation and growth: Causality and causes, Journal of Monetary 
Economics 
15
Schumpeter (1934), The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry Into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and 
the Business Cycle 
16
 Calderon & Liu (2003) ,The Direction of Causality Between Financial Development and Economic Growth; 
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under-development is more likely to hold growth back in developing countries. Therefore, FSD 
has a two pronged approach when it comes to poverty. 
1. It can directly reduce poverty as it improves financial resource allocation to the poor and 
increases their access to lines of credit. 
2. Indirectly through economic growth. Due to the high demand labor wages are generally 
pushed up and this increase in incomes has a direct impact on the consumption of the 
poor which in turn affects their poverty.  
The major drawback to the impacts of FSD on poverty could be financial repression. Financial 
repression explains how government controls, laws, and other nonmarket limits prevent the 
financial intermediaries of an economy from functioning at their full ability. The policies that 
cause financial repression include interest rate ceilings, liquidity ratio, high bank reserve needs, 
among others. McKinnon (1973)
17
 and Shaw (1973)
18
 argue that based on the past government 
intervention in the financial sector restricts competition in both developed and developing 
countries and in so doing discourages investments. 
3. Data, summary statistics, and econometric methods 
To carry out our statistical analyses, we need mainly measures of poverty and measures of 
financial development. Also, we need econometric methods and models to identify and discover 
the link between financial sector development and poverty. This part of our study, therefore 
highlights, defines, interprets and describes the variables, the models and descriptive statistics, 
inclusive of basic correlations. The measurement indicators used in this study, are all from the 
                                                          
17
 Ronald McKinnon (1973) , Money and Capital in Economic Development (1973), Brookings Institute 
 
18
 EDWARD S. SHAW: Financial Deepening in Economic Development, Oxford University Press, London-Toronto, 
1973. 
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World Bank database, the poverty variables specifically come from the Povcalnet. All the 
financial sector indicators (Bank Assets ratio, M2, Private credit) are from the Global Financial 
Development Database. The explanatory and control variables in this study are from the World 
Bank, database. 
3.1.Data: Financial Development 
To measure financial development, I choose indicators that measure the depth of the financial 
sector, and the size of the financial sector. These are the commonly used indicators as they are 
strongly and positively related to economic growth. Accurately to measure financial 
development we need indicators that cover, how the efficiency of the financial system lessens 
transaction costs, improves allocation, mobilizes savings and exerts corporate governance. 
Unfortunately it's never easy to build such measurement variables; therefore I use traditionally 
available and used indicators of FSD robustly related to economic growth. 
a) Private Credit 
 Private Credit is the total value of credit by financial intermediaries to the private sector as a % 
of GDP. This is a sound measure of FSD and a reflection of private savings as it excludes credit 
issued by the central bank. Used by Ross and Zervos (1998), it doesn’t count credit to the public 
sector, as much as credit to state owned businesses. Similarly, it excludes inter or cross claims of 
one group of intermediaries on another (Ross et Zervos 1998). Also, private credit to GDP has 
been shown to grow faster and experience faster rates of poverty decline (Thorsten, Ross et 
Norman 2000); (Beck, Asli et Ross 2007). Private credit distinguishes credit issued by money 
banks or financial institutions other than the central bank. Further private credit helps capture the 
difference between credit issued to the private sector and credit issued to the public sector.  
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Higher ratios of private credit may represent higher financial intermediation and financial 
development. Thus, private credit is a good measure to identify, credit from individual savers, 
through financial intermediaries, to private firms. In SSA private credit as a ratio to GDP ranges 
from as low as 0.15% for Congo Zaire in 2000 to as high as 81.91% in South Africa in the year 
2007. The average private credit to GDP ratio for SSA during the period covered by this study 
was 14.43%. 
b) M2 + Quasi-money (M2): 
Money and quasi-money is currency outside banks, demand deposits other than those of the 
central government, time savings, and foreign currency deposits of resident sectors other than the 
central government as a % of GDP. M2 measures the liquidity supplies of the economy and the 
size or depth of the financial intermediaries in a country. The major weakness of this measure is 
that it does not highlight the transfer of society’s savings to the private sector entrepreneurs and 
private sector projects. Thus, basic roles of financial intermediaries are inaccurately captured. In 
this study, in SSA the average M2 as a % of GDP was 24.81%, significantly higher than the ratio 
of private credit to GDP. Also the ratio ranged from as low as 0.83% in Zaire Congo, in the year 
2000, to as high as 101.88% in Angola in the year 1985. 
c) Bank Assets Ratio to GDP:19 
The bank assets ratio to GDP measures the total assets held by deposit money banks as a share of 
GDP. These assets include claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector which includes central, 
state and local governments, nonfinancial public enterprises and private sector. Deposit money 
                                                          
19(International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, and World Bank GDP 
estimates) 
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banks comprise commercial banks and other financial institutions that accept transferable 
deposits, such as demand deposits.  
Commercial banks are expected to be more effective in earmarking savings to productive 
projects. Commercial banks are likely to oversee the management, and increase in savings 
mobilization in the economy than Central Banks. Nonetheless, this indicator doesn’t capture how 
the financial resources are distributed. Also, commercial banks aren’t the only financial 
institutions mobilizing, pooling and spreading the nation’s financial resources. Hence, this 
indicator may fail to capture or highlight the country specific variations in financial development. 
3.2.Data: Poverty 
To study the impacts of FSD on poverty, we use two proxies for poverty namely, poverty gap 
and the headcount ratio. These indicators complement and supplement each other. The data for 
poverty is at three year intervals from 1981-2010; therefore all variables including the financial 
development indicators are averaged over three year intervals. The head-count is a ratio of poor 
people against those above the poverty line, while the poverty gap does a better job in measuring 
poverty intensity. For robust results we use these two poverty measurement variables to clearly 
see if financial sector development has any effect on poverty at all.  
a) Poverty headcount ratio at $1.25 a day (PPP) 
This is the ratio of people living under the $1.25 a day poverty line as a % of total population. 
This indicator is easy to use and explain, but then weak as it doesn’t measure the gravity of the 
poverty. It doesn’t ‘measure how poor is poor, and how far those poor people are far from the 
poverty line. For instance even if incomes of the richer of the population where cut in half, the 
headcount will most likely not change, so it is difficult at times to use it as a measure of poverty, 
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especially in countries with great inequality. Furthermore the headcount ratio which is a measure 
of absolute poverty focuses on households and not individuals. In so doing the headcount ratio 
might imply that a given % of households are poor, while this figure might relatively mean a 
great % of the population is poor (given large households). 
b) Poverty Gap at the $1.25 
Poverty gap is the average shortfall of the poor people’s incomes from the poverty line (counting 
the non-poor as having zero shortfall), expressed as a % of the poverty line. In averaging, the 
incomes of the poor and evaluating how far they fall from the poverty line, the poverty gap 
indicates not only the depth, but the intensity of poverty. The poverty gap also makes it easy for 
policy makers to identify the cost of lessening poverty. Poverty gap is the cost of reducing 
poverty, because it shows how much would have to be transferred to the poor to bring their 
incomes or expenditures up to the poverty line.  
 
3.3.Econometric methodology 
3.3.1. Panel Fixed Effects 
I begin by running panel fixed effects regressions on data for all the countries averaged over 
three year periods. All my dependent and explanatory variables data are averaged over three year 
periods. Our model is; 
y
i,tyi,t1FDi,t Xi,t i,t. 
 
In the model, yi,t is either the logarithm of (i) the poverty gap, (ii) the headcount ratio for 
country i. FDi,t is the Private Credit or the bank assets ratio, or the  M2, and Xi,t implies a 
18 | P a g e  
 
number of country specific conditioning variables in period t. In this model I control for net 
ODA as we’re interested in the impacts of FSD beyond the contribution of foreign aid, and 
economic growth for mean income growth. Further, I control for inflation to cover the 
prevailing macroeconomic conditions, trade to capture the degree of market and country 
international openness. I also control for the tertiary gross enrollment ratio schooling as an 
indicator of human capital stock in the economies. Also, control of corruption, government 
effectiveness and political stability
20
 to control for the prevailing political atmosphere and 
efficiency of government. I include FDI, remittances, population growth and an interaction 
term as extra variables. Controlling for corruption is in response to the blame put on corrupt 
government officials for the ineffectiveness net ODA. Therefore, to strengthen my theory I 
control for corruption to see if financial development can have a positive impact on poverty 
alleviation beyond the effects of corruption. For robustness checks in Table 2, I interact private 
credit and net ODA individually with economic growth, to see if these two fare any better in 
countries with relatively high economic growth.  
Additionally I also run the same regressions on my primary poverty measure, using different 
FSD proxies namely m2 and the bank assets ratio, to check the validity of my assumptions. 
Similarly, I interact net ODA with Economic growth to see if financial development will have 
significant impacts in conditions where net-ODA has positive impacts on poverty alleviation 
under a positive economic growth environment. 
3.3.2. Instrumental variables Fixed Effects 
The relationship between financial development and poverty might be reverse. Poverty, may 
lead people to be innovative, leading to a greater demand in financial services. In which case 
if the banks respond positively we might see growth in the financial sector as these poor 
                                                          
20
 The three variables are specifically from the World Governance Indicators, produced by the World Bank. 
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people start up small income creating projects, and save the little profits they make. This 
might actually be the case in most Sub-Saharan countries which rely greatly on farming for 
sustenance.  
To this end, to account for causality, we use a fixed effects instrumental variable estimator 
with clustered standard errors.  
This estimation method is robust to heteroskedasticity and also to serial correlation. For 
my the instruments I use lagged values of the explanatory variables, this gives us consistent 
results, but the robustness of the coefficients subscribe to the assumption that we don’t have 
serial correlation. To account for these issues, which may bias our results, I test for the weight 
of my assumptions by running the Hansen J test for over identified restrictions. The null 
hypothesis for this test is that the instruments are valid instruments, meaning that they are 
uncorrelated with the error term and that the instruments are exogenous and correctly 
excluded from the estimated equation.  
 
3.4.Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table 1, using Panel Data of 40 Sub-Saharan countries presents descriptive statistics and 
correlations for our measurement variables for the period between 1981 and 2010, averaged 
over three year intervals. Data collection in SSA countries left out, inclusive of Somalia, 
Congo (COG), and South Sudan, countries has been hampered by armed conflicts. Also left 
out is Zimbabwe, Sao Tome principle, Comoros Island, Mauritania and Mauritius which don’t 
have sufficient poverty information during the period of study. With the remaining countries 
we collect sufficient data, which provides for us a strongly balanced dataset, whose results can 
be relied upon.  
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It is striking to highlight the positive correlation ship between, the measures of 
financial development and the measures of poverty. Consistent with earlier work, financial 
development is positively and significantly correlated with GDP per capita growth, but 
negatively correlated with Headcount (Honohan, 2004). This indicates that countries with 
more developed financial systems experience a faster reduction in poverty levels. Private 
Credit, M2 and the bank’s assets ratio to GDP have a negative impact on poverty.  
Meaning an improvement in financial development will lead to a decline in poverty. 
Interestingly, measures of financial development have greater impact on the poverty gap than 
on the headcount. This might mean that financial development fights poverty more efficiently, 
by reducing income inequality, and the intensity of the degree of poverty experienced by the 
poor households. 
 
 
3.5. Table 1: Summary Statistics and Correlations 
Part A presents the descriptive statistics and Part B and C present the pair-wise correlations.  
Private Credit is the log of financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic money 
banks as a share of GDP. Bank assets ratio equals the log of bank capital and reserves to total 
assets as a % of GDP. M2, money and quasi money comprise the sum of currency outside banks, 
demand deposits other than those of the central government. Net ODA equals the logarithm of 
the net official development aid (ODA) as a % of GNI. Economic growth equals the % growth 
rate of real GDP per capita. 
Panel A 
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Panel B 
 
Headcount Poverty Gap Private Credit Bank Assets M2 Net ODA Eco Gro 
Headcount 1 
      Poverty Gap 0.9664* 1 
     Private Credit -0.3359* -0.3392* 1 
    Bank Assets -0.3283* -0.3357* 0.9425* 1 
   M2 -0.2697* -0.2962* 0.6903* 0.7217* 1 
  Net ODA 0.3921* 0.3721* -0.2359* -0.2242* -0.1275 1 
 Economic Growth 0.0951 0.081 0.0356 0.0344 0.0369 0.0973 1 
 
4. Empirical results 
In this section I present the results from the regressions I run between financial sector 
development and poverty through the proxy variables or both poverty and financial sector 
development. Private Credit as it considers the distribution effect of savings to the private sector 
is my main proxy for financial development. Similarly, poverty gap, which is a more robust 
measure of poverty, is my main dependent poverty proxy. For robustness checks, I use the 
headcount for poverty while for FSD I use the bank assets ratio and M2. 
  In Table 2 and 3, I present results for Private Credit, against both the poverty gap and the 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Headcount 400 3.812606 0.6695849 0.07863 4.5866 
Poverty Gap 400 2.893102 0.9555011 -1.5506 4.28386 
Private Credit 330 2.3077 0.8557582 -1.156 4.32998 
Bank Assets 330 2.610753 0.7969728 -0.9269 4.44617 
M2 379 3.091247 0.4974219 0.20727 4.62379 
Net ODA 387 2.101561 1.203579 -7.7021 4.65743 
Economic growth 386 2.133913 10.79895 -25.718 126.9526 
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headcount ratio. I present results for regressions run using the panel fixed effects estimator and 
the IV fixed effects estimator. Also, I include explanatory variables, to explain prevailing 
macroeconomic environment, the political environment and the effects of external help. 
For robustness, I reproduce the regressions in Tables 2, using the Bank Assets ratio in Table 5, 
while using M2 in Tables 6 and 7.  In Table 4 I use the Bank Assets ratio as a proxy for FSD. All 
the results report the  R² and number of observations, while also the IV fixed effects estimators 
report the Hansen  test statistic for over identifying restrictions, p-value (OIR). 
The null hypothesis for the OIR, states that the instruments used are valid, and this test holds 
true in my analysis. For all my IV fixed effects results the null hypothesis for the OIR is not 
rejected, confirming the weight of my instruments. 
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4.1.Table 2: Private Credit and the Poverty Gap 
Poverty gap is the log of the % of population living in households with consumption or income per person below the $1.25 poverty line. 
Private Credit is the log of financial resources provided to the private sector by domestic money banks as a share of GDP. Net ODA 
equals the logarithm of the net official development assistance (ODA) as a % of GNI. Economic growth equals the % growth rate of 
real GDP per capita. Inflation is the log growth rate of the consumer prices during the sample period. Schooling is lagged variable of 
the gross enrollment ratio. Population growth (annual %) is the exponential rate of growth of midyear population, expressed as a 
percentage. Trade equals the logarithm of the share of exports plus imports relative to GDP. Personal remittances comprise the log of 
net personal transfers and compensation of employees from non-resident households. Political Stability reflects opinions of the 
likelihood the government will be destabilized. Corruption Control reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain. Government effectiveness is an index which reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation. The net ODA*Eco growth cap is the interaction term between Economic Growth and the log of net ODA. Pvt 
Credit*Eco growth is the interaction term between Economic Growth and the log of private cred it. Regressions1 - 5 are 
estimated using panel fixed effects with robust standard errors, while regression 6 is estimated using the IV panel fixed effects 
estimator with clustered standard errors. All specifications report the R-squared, while on the other hand regression 6 reports the 
Hansen statistic of over identification restrictions. 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
 (1) 
Fixed 
Effects 
Poverty Gap 
(2) 
Fixed 
Effects 
Poverty Gap 
(3) 
Fixed 
Effects 
Poverty Gap 
(4) 
Fixed 
Effects 
Poverty Gap 
(5) 
Fixed 
Effects 
Poverty Gap 
(6) 
IV Fixed 
Effects 
Poverty Gap 
Private Credit -0.213 -0.331 -0.282 -0.295 -0.338 -0.424 
 (3.01)** (3.94)** (2.13)* (2.21)* (2.36)* (2.96)** 
Net-ODA 0.145 -0.021 -0.008 0.044 0.108 -0.030 
 (3.10)** (0.41) (0.18) (0.84) (2.00)* (0.53) 
Economic Growth 0.015 0.027 0.014 0.019 0.010 0.021 
 (1.50) (2.23)* (0.88) (1.17) (0.09) (1.91) 
Inflation 0.065 -0.062 -0.054 -0.009 -0.003 -0.076 
 (1.57) (1.58) (1.60) (0.33) (0.13) (1.72) 
Political Stability  -0.166 -0.245 -0.316 -0.310 -0.165 
  (2.20)* (2.99)** (4.22)** (4.43)** (2.04)* 
Trade   -0.354 -0.429 -0.448  
   (2.14)* (3.46)** (3.81)**  
Government Expe   0.315 0.301 0.280  
   (1.13) (1.31) (1.20)  
Remittances   0.014 0.005 0.015  
   (0.35) (0.15) (0.44)  
Lag Schooling   -0.081 -0.099 -0.098  
   (2.04)* (2.87)** (2.97)**  
Population Gro    0.223 0.205  
    (1.89) (1.58)  
Government Effectv    -0.505 -0.553  
    (2.83)** (2.95)**  
Control of Corruption    0.032 0.035  
    (3.42)** (4.24)**  
Pvt Credit*Eco Gro     0.020  
     (0.66)  
Net ODA*Eco Gro     -0.021  
     (1.30)  
_cons 2.888 3.571 4.303 3.652 3.760  
 (12.97)** (14.91)** (6.83)** (5.66)** (6.65)**  
R2 0.14 0.20 0.43 0.53 0.55 0.19 
N 
OIR test(p value) 
319 183 108 108 108 171 
0.3674 
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Private credit in the above models enters negatively significant to the poverty gap for all the 
regressions 1-6. First at p < 1% for regressions 1, 2 and 6 while secondly for regressions 3, 4 
significant at the p <5% level 5. This implies that financial development has strong to very strong 
impacts on poverty reduction. To control for endogeneity we employ the fixed effects estimation 
technique, and to control for reverse causality and omitted variable bias, we employ the use of the 
instrumental variable fixed effects estimator using internal instruments. The Hansen test which 
tests for the validity of the instruments, confirms the weight of our instruments, by failing to reject 
the null hypothesis which states that our instruments are valid.  
To control for potential serial correlation I use clustered standard errors which are not only 
robust to heteroskedasticity, but also to within serial correlation. According to the results in Table 2, 
a 1% change in private credit can lead to between 0.213% to 0.424% reductions in the poverty gap. 
As for net ODA, its results prove insignificant to poverty reduction, though, while it’s a welcome 
result to note that when we control for political stability the sign to the coefficient of net-ODA 
becomes negative, it is nonetheless insignificant. Only when we control for population growth, 
control of corruption and government effectiveness does the sign for insignificant coefficient 
becomes positive. This could be due to the contribution of corruption to poverty in SSA. Most SSA, 
countries are plagued by corruption at the highest levels of governance.  
Of the 40 countries of study 37 countries are doing badly with respect to control of 
corruption, as according to the World Bank governance indicators these countries have poor 
governance performance. Economic growth, according to these results, doesn’t contribute to 
reducing the poverty gap, most likely because of inequality and weak institutions that seemingly 
benefit the few grace to the high levels of corruption.  
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Inflation when controlling for political stability, assumes a negative insignificant impact on 
poverty gap, since under high inflation most basic services needs go beyond the reach of many 
poor people. On the other hand, not only does inflation erode the buying power of consumers, but 
it also erodes the wages of the poor, which more times than often are never adjusted for 
inflationary effects. Political Stability contributes to poverty alleviation, by assuring a sustainable 
and stable geopolitical atmosphere for the implementation of short and long term government 
policies in the fight against poverty.  
Countries with stable political environments can plan and since there is continuity of 
government, there is more room for improved project implementation, crafting of long-term 
policies, and attracting foreign investors for long-term business ventures. Sustainable development 
can only be possible in countries with effective governments and stable political conditions, for 
example, looking at SSA, many of the countries are rocked in political conflicts and have a history 
of coups d’états. Countries which are doing better economically and in many respects in SSA, are 
those free from prolonged political conflicts, and whose governments are quite effective, namely 
South Africa, Namibia, and Botswana.  
Another example will be looking at countries north of the Sahara which constitute the top ten 
biggest economies in Africa, and fair equally well on governance and institutional quality 
performance. For the other explanatory variables the results are the same as those for the impact of 
private credit on the headcount ratio in Table 3, namely schooling and government effectiveness, 
which consistently enter negatively significant to the poverty gap and the headcount even when 
controlling for possible effects of economic growth on the performance of private credit or net 
ODA as captured by the two interaction terms.  
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4.2. Table 3: Private Credit and the Headcount ratio. 
The dependent variable is Headcount ratio, which equals the log of the % of the population living in households with consumption or 
income per person below the poverty line of $1.25. Private Credit is the log of financial resources provided to the private sector by 
domestic money banks as a share of GDP. Net ODA equals the logarithm of the net official development assistance (ODA) as a % of 
GNI. Economic growth equals the % growth rate of real GDP per capita. Inflation is the log growth rate of the consumer prices 
during the sample period. Schooling is lagged variable of the gross enrollment ratio. Population growth (annual %) is the exponential 
rate of growth of midyear population, expressed as a percentage. Trade equals the logarithm of the share of exports plus imports 
relative to GDP. Personal remittances comprise the log of net personal transfers and compensation of employees from non-resident 
households. Political Stability reflects perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized. Corruption Control 
reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain. Government effectiveness is an index which 
reflects perceptions of the quality of public services. The net ODA*Eco growth cap is the interaction term between Economic 
Growth and the log of net ODA. Pvt Credit*Eco growth is the interaction term between Economic Growth and the log of private 
credit. Regressions1-5 are estimated using panel fixed effects, while regression 6 is estimated using IV fixed effects estimator with. 
All specifications report the R-squared, while regression 6 reports the over identification restrictions statistic. 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 (1) 
Fixed Effects 
Headcount 
(2) 
Fixed Effects 
Headcount 
(3) 
Fixed Effects 
Headcount 
(4) 
Fixed Effects 
Headcount 
(5) 
Fixed Effects 
Headcount 
(6) 
IV Fixed Effects 
Headcount 
Private Credit -0.174 -0.219 -0.197 -0.212 -0.211 -0.231 
 (3.85)** (3.84)** (2.07)* (2.30)* (2.19)* (2.35)* 
Net-ODA 0.100 -0.018 -0.028 0.003 0.044 -0.021 
 (3.05)** (0.50) (0.88) (0.09) (1.20) (0.56) 
Economic Growth 0.006 0.017 0.007 0.009 0.035 0.013 
 (1.12) (2.09)* (0.63) (0.84) (0.44) (1.69) 
Inflation 0.017 -0.044 -0.022 0.001 0.005 -0.055 
 (0.93) (1.50) (1.12) (0.05) (0.33) (1.66) 
Political Stability  -0.088 -0.159 -0.223 -0.223 -0.094 
  (1.81) (2.91)** (4.79)** (4.98)** (1.86) 
Trade   -0.187 -0.228 -0.232  
   (1.67) (2.75)** (2.92)**  
Government Expe   0.241 0.239 0.233  
   (1.26) (1.67) (1.65)  
Remittances   0.014 0.007 0.015  
   (0.56) (0.36) (0.71)  
Lag Schooling   -0.059 -0.070 -0.070  
   (2.23)* (3.08)** (3.22)**  
Population Gro    0.189 0.170  
    (2.65)* (2.08)*  
Government Effectv    -0.281 -0.293  
    (2.43)* (2.35)*  
Control of Corruption    0.024 0.025  
    (4.03)** (4.51)**  
Pvt Credit*Eco Gro     0.001  
     (0.04)  
Net ODA*Eco Gro     -0.014  
     (1.23)  
_cons 3.944 4.312 4.583 4.059 4.039  
 (28.75)**  (27.89)** (9.52)** (9.31)** (10.88)**  
R2 0.15 0.16 0.44 0.55 0.56 0.16 
N 
Over Identifying 
 Restrictions test(p value) 
319 183 108 108 108 171 
0.3570 
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Private credit in the above regression models enters significantly to headcount in all regressions 
1–6 under both the panel fixed effects and dynamic panel estimator with errors robust to 
heteroskedasticity. A 1% increase in private credit will lead to a reduction in the headcount ratio 
by between, 0.17 % - 0.315% a range consisting of both the panel fixed effects and instrumental 
variable panel estimators. In using the instrumental variable fixed effects estimator to cancel out 
reverse causality, we apply lagged variables of explanatory exogenous variables as instruments, 
to get consistent and robust results. As in Table 2, to account for potential within serial 
correlation, I use clustered standard errors, which are robust to both heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation. The Hansen test for over identifying restrictions accepts the null hypothesis, which 
holds to the assumption that our instruments are valid. Similarly, by using lagged variables in our 
model we get results that prove causality and not just a mere correlation between our dependent 
variables and independent variables.  
The above results are significant even when controlling for the socio- economic and 
political environments in the corresponding countries covered by this study. The result is echoed 
when we control for population growth, control of corruption, political stability, remittances, 
schooling, FDI and trade. Interestingly, in regression 2 when we control for political stability 
net-ODA assumes a negative though insignificant result on the headcount and this result holds 
even under the dynamic panel estimator with the exception of regressions 4 and 5 when we 
control for government effectiveness and control for corruption. In these regressions government 
effectiveness enters negatively significant to the headcount implying a significant contribution to 
headcount reduction, while in the same regressions net-ODA and inflation assume positive 
insignificant results. This might imply that countries with relatively effective governments might 
not need social net ODA per see since the locally formulated policies of the government are 
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equally effective towards fighting poverty. Hence, given this countries should consider 
redirecting net ODA towards infrastructural development and stimulation of economic growth. 
Similarly, political stability enters negatively significant against the headcount at a 1% level 
from the 3
rd
 to the 5
th
 regression, implying the importance of stable political environments in 
formulating and enforcing meaningful and sustainable government policies in the fight against 
poverty. Additionally, schooling enters negatively significant to the headcount in regressions 3-5, 
making a point for improved education quality and access. In this model we use a lagged 
variable for schooling. It only makes sense to say the benefits of this year’s gross tertiary 
enrollment will have effects in the coming years and not in this very same year per see. In 
tertiary enrollment SSA falls behind at 8.1%, according to the World Bank (2012, all income 
levels) while East Asia & Pacific stand at 30.7%, Middle East & North Africa at 33.9%, Latin 
America & Caribbean at 43%, Europe & Central Asia 63.1%.  
Population growth as expected enters positively significant to the headcount ratio; this 
makes perfect sense in the case of Sub Saharan Africa, when population growth isn’t followed by 
more job creation and improved access to social services for all. Of course the debate on the 
effects of population on poverty is still ongoing with the Neo-Malthusians arguing that reduced 
fertility rates play a part in poverty reduction. Joshi & Schultz (2007) found out that high fertility 
rates can and do act as a brick wall to poverty reduction and economic growth; though he 
remains skeptical about how strong this relationship is as opposed to neo Malthusian who 
purport that this is a very strong relationship (Joshi 2007)
21
. Similarly Canning & Schofield 
(2007) found that a birth every three years, greatly underplayed the role of females in labor force 
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 Joshi S., Schultz P. T. 2007 Family planning as an investment in development: evaluation of a program's 
consequences in Matlab, Bangladesh 
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participation by 20% (Canning 2007)
22
. In turn, this decline in income, in turn, would reduce the 
household expenditure, reducing consumption and thus pushing a great many homes into poverty. 
The results for the interaction terms for both private credit and net oda are insignificant to the 
headcount, though it is worth to note that for net ODA*Economic growth the coefficient is 
negative, nonetheless insignificant. This implies that the impacts of private credit and net ODA 
on headcount are not conditioned by economic growth, and since economic growth itself enters 
insignificant to the headcount, it only makes sense to conclude by saying that economic growth 
in SSA hasn’t led to faster reductions in poverty. Inequality might be one of the reasons why 
economic growth hasn’t translated into poverty reduction.  
In most of SSA the cliché, the rich get richer while the poor get even poorer holds true in 
most respects, also partly due to high corruption levels as confirmed by the impacts of corruption 
on headcount, which stand positively significant. In most of SSA, countries have poor 
governance performance and as such weak corruption control as such corruption enters 
positively significant to the headcount ratio at a 1% level implying a strong relationship between 
corruption and poverty. According to the control of corruption index, of the 40 countries in this 
study only three countries (Botswana, Namibia and South Africa) have relatively good 
governance performance in the fight against corruption.  
This reveals that SSA has quite a number of channels through which it can combat 
poverty, not only in the short run, but also in the long run. These results imply that given some 
good set of institutions and policies SSA can benefit from financial development, improved 
quality if education and increased trade.  
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 Canning D. E., Schofield H. 2007 The effect of fertility on female labor supply and household poverty in 
Indonesia 
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4.3.Table 4: Bank Assets and the Poverty Gap 
Poverty gap is the log of the % of population living in households with consumption or income per person below the $1.25 poverty line. 
Bank assets ratio equals the log of bank capital and reserves to total assets as a % of GDP. Net ODA equals the logarithm of the net 
official development assistance (ODA) as a % of GNI. Economic growth equals the % growth rate of real GDP per capita. Inflation is the log 
growth rate of the consumer prices during the sample period. Schooling (L.1.) is lagged variable of the gross enrollment ratio. Population 
growth (annual %) is the exponential rate of growth of midyear population, expressed as a percentage. Trade equals the logarithm of the share 
of exports plus imports relative to GDP. Remittances comprise the log of net personal transfers and compensation of employees from non-
resident households. Political Stability reflects perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized. Corruption Control 
reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain. Government effectiveness is an index which reflects 
perceptions of the quality of public services. The net ODA*Eco growth cap is the interaction term between Economic Growth and the log of 
net ODA. Pvt Credit*Eco growth is the interaction term between Economic Growth and the log of private credit. Regressions1 – 5, 
estimated using panel fixed effects, with robust standard errors while (6) reports IV fixed effects with clustered standard errors. 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
 (1) 
Fixed Effects 
Poverty Gap 
(2) 
Fixed Effects 
Poverty Gap 
(3) 
Fixed Effects 
Poverty Gap 
(4) 
Fixed Effects 
Poverty Gap 
(5) 
Fixed Effects 
Poverty Gap 
(6) 
IV Fixed 
Effects 
Poverty Gap 
Bank Assets -0.222 -0.290 -0.301 -0.282 -0.311 -0.227 
 (3.14)** (3.48)** (2.12)* (1.88) (2.03)* (2.39)* 
Net ODA 0.136 -0.023 0.002 0.046 0.125 -0.120 
 (2.92)** (0.43) (0.04) (0.81) (2.31)* (1.16) 
Economic Growth 0.013 0.026 0.010 0.016 0.039 0.035 
 (1.16) (2.11)* (0.61) (0.97) (0.40) (2.02)* 
Inflation 0.063 -0.070 -0.053 -0.012 -0.004 -0.086 
 (1.53) (1.82) (1.55) (0.38) (0.14) (0.52) 
Political Stability  -0.170 -0.246 -0.306 -0.300 -0.082 
  (2.23)* (3.01)** (3.96)** (4.13)** (0.51) 
Trade   -0.307 -0.371 -0.378  
   (1.84) (2.80)** (3.06)**  
Government Exp   0.325 0.306 0.292  
   (1.18) (1.31) (1.25)  
Remittances   0.015 0.008 0.021  
   (0.36) (0.21) (0.56)  
L.1.   -0.087 -0.106 -0.104  
   (2.19)* (3.01)** (3.04)**  
Population Growth    0.207 0.175  
    (1.76) (1.44)  
Government Effectiv    -0.501 -0.537  
    (2.77)** (2.78)**  
Control of Corruption    0.021 0.023  
    (2.75)** (3.51)**  
Private Credit*Eco Gro     0.011  
     (0.40)  
Net ODA*Eco Gro     -0.026  
     (1.87)  
_cons 3.000 3.584 4.229 3.527 3.553  
 (12.57)** (14.13)** (7.13)** (5.18)** (6.00)**  
R
2
 0.13 0.17 0.44 0.52 0.54 0.22 
N 
OIR 
  319 183 108 108 108 78 
0.9102 
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For robustness checks, in the above regressions I use the bank assets ratio as a proxy for FSD. 
The bank assets ratio enters significantly to reduction in the poverty gap through equations 1 – 3 
and 5-6. For regressions 1 and 2 the bank assets enters strongly significant to the  poverty gap 
while for the last two regressions it enters significantly to the poverty gap. Given the model and 
specifications used I find that a 1% increase in the bank assets ratio will lead to between 0.22% 
to 0.31% reductions of the poverty gap.   
As in Table 2 and Table 3, I find here that schooling and political stability continue to 
contribute significantly to poverty alleviation. Also, trade in these regressions contributes 
positively to poverty alleviation. The other explanatory variables, namely government 
expenditure, inflation, trade and remittances enter insignificantly to the poverty gap, but they 
retain their coefficient signs (+ or -) similar to those in tables 2 and 3. Similarly, we also control 
for the effects of the population growth, as the population size determines the demand of 
financial resources and other social services. Of significance is the fact that when we introduce 
government effectiveness and control of corruption the Bank Assets ratio is insignificant to 
poverty reduction at a 5% level. This might mean given strong institutions, the banks though 
significant at the 10% level their contribution to poverty reduction is down played by some other 
government initiatives. 
Controlling for political stability is inspired by recent literature which studies the contribution of 
institutions to development and economic growth, a component in which most SSA countries 
still fall behind. According to the Fund for Peace, 70% of the 10 most failed states, are Sub-
Saharan African countries. The significance of a stable political atmosphere in any country, can 
bring about investments, long term government projects and consistency in social service 
delivery to curtail poverty in developing countries. As such these results have strong policy 
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implications, as SSA looks at the post 2015 MDG’s era.  
4.4.Table 5: Bank Assets ratio and the Headcount ratio 
The dependent variable is Headcount ratio, which equals the log of the % of the population living in households with 
consumption per person below the poverty line of $1.25. Bank assets ratio equals the log of bank capital and reserves to 
total assets as a % of GDP. Net ODA equals the logarithm of the net official development assistance (ODA) as a % of 
GNI. Economic growth equals the % growth rate of real GDP per capita. Inflation is the log growth rate of the consumer 
prices during the sample period. Schooling is lagged variable of the gross enrollment ratio. Population growth (annual %) 
is the exponential rate of growth of midyear population, expressed as a percentage. Trade equals the logarithm of the share 
of exports plus imports relative to GDP. Remittances comprise the log of net personal transfers and compensation of 
employees from non-resident households. Political Stability reflects perceptions of the likelihood that the government will 
be destabilized. Corruption Control reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain. 
Government effectiveness is an index which reflects perceptions of the quality of public services. The net ODA*Eco 
growth cap is the interaction term between Economic Growth and the log of net ODA. Pvt Credit*Eco growth is the 
interaction term between Economic Growth and the log of private credit. Regressions1 – 5, estimated using panel fixed 
 (1) 
Fixed 
Effects 
Headcount 
 
(2) 
Fixed 
Effects 
Headcount 
 
(3) 
Fixed 
Effects 
Headcount 
 
       (4) 
Fixed 
Effects 
Headcount 
 
(5) 
Fixed 
Effects 
Headcount 
 
(6) 
IV Fixed Effects 
Headcount 
Bank Assets -0.180 -0.187 -0.221 -0.211 -0.206 -0.399 
  (4.14)** (3.20)** (2.18)* (2.02) * (1.98) * (3.73)** 
Net ODA 0.092 -0.019 -0.020 0.005 0.054 -0.016 
 (2.79)** (0.52) (0.69) (0.14) (1.51) (0.31) 
Economic Growth 0.004 0.016* 0.004 0.007 0.048 0.017 
 (0.68) (1.96) (0.34) (0.62) (0.67) (2.19)* 
Inflation 0.016 -0.049 -0.022 -0.001 0.005 -0.061 
 (0.86) (1.70) (1.08) (0.05) (0.27) (1.77) 
Political Stability  -0.091 -0.158 -0.215 -0.215 -0.060 
  (1.84) (2.88)** (4.33)** (4.52)** (0.93) 
Trade   -0.150 -0.183 -0.185  
   (1.37) (2.16)* (2.35)*  
Government Exp   0.253 0.246 0.242  
   (1.34) (1.70) (1.72)  
Remittances   0.014 0.009 0.018  
   (0.57) (0.40) (0.80)  
L.1. Schooling   -0.062 -0.074 -0.074  
   (2.38)* (3.19)** (3.22)**  
Population Growth    0.178 0.153  
    (2.53)* (2.03) *  
Government Effectiv    -0.277 -0.284  
    (2.34)* (2.23)*  
Control of Corruption    0.016 0.018  
    (3.88)** (4.43)**  
Private Credit*Eco Gro     -0.003  
     (0.13)  
Net ODA*Eco Gro     -0.018  
     (1.68)  
_cons 4.033 4.307 4.528 3.969 3.922  
 (28.38)** (25.72)** (10.55)** (9.18)** (10.99)**  
R
2
 0.15 0.13 0.46 0.55 0.56 0.04 
N 
OIR 
319 183 108 108 108 179 
0.7073 
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effects, with robust standard errors while (5) reports IV fixed effects with clustered standard errors. 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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In the above regressions we use the bank assets ratio instead of private credit as a proxy for 
financial development. The results are quite similar as in Table 2 and 3, I find that financial 
development reduces the headcount ratio, and this is through the direct impacts of financial 
development on the poor. Financial development helps facilitate credit access and by offering the 
poor a formal institution to store their incomes not only do the poor benefit from the loans to buy 
productive assets, or investing in their children’s education, the poor can also earn interest on 
their savings.  
In the above regressions a 1% increase in the bank assets ratio will translate to a decrease 
in the headcount ratio by 0.180% to 0.399%. Political stability and government effectiveness 
continue to be on the fore front of fighting poverty in SSA, interestingly schooling also plays a 
pivotal role and contributes significantly to fighting poverty in SSA. On the other hand a 1 unit 
improvement in Political Stability will lead to a 0.158% to 0.221% reduction in the headcount 
ratio. For schooling, a 1% increase in schooling will lead to a 0.062% to 0.074% reduction in the 
headcount, while a 1 unit increase in government effectiveness leads to 0.277 to 0.284 decrease 
in the headcount and all the above results hold when holding all other factors constant.  
Since the headcount measures or basically counts the number of poor people as a fraction of 
those who are relatively richer at the $1.25 poverty line, the poverty gap becomes a better 
measure of poverty line it not only measures the number of the poor, but also by what margin 
they fall from the poverty line. Hence the poverty gap gives government and policy makers a 
more defined idea as to how much is needed to push people out of poverty.  
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Nonetheless, the headcount, since it’s easier to use, it might not tell us how poor is poor, 
yet still an significant reduction in the number of poor people is still welcome news in SSA, a 
region that continues to be the poorest in the world, and lagging behind many regions in the 
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. After having controlled for 
heteroskedasticity and endogeneity, we still find that financial development reduces the number 
of the poor people in SSA.  
Furthermore these results are consistent even when we’re controlling for country specific 
time variant effects, namely political stability, inflation, economic growth and the interaction 
terms. Economic growth fails to reduce the number of poor people in SSA, presumable because 
of inequality as I earlier on alluded, and this is just one of the ways we can explain this 
disturbing result, but since the main variable of study is not economic growth, this could be a 
subject for another time, which has to be studied along with its own relevant explanatory 
variables and relevant econometric models and assumptions.  
Trade enters significant in the reduction of the headcount, and this could be another 
important channel that government s can build upon to stimulate economic growth and poverty 
alleviation as the poor have access to goods of better quality and also benefit from market 
competition that comes with trade. Additionally, like in the case of South Africa, many citizens 
of the SADC travel to South Africa to buy goods in bulk and return to their home countries to 
sell these good in their local markets. Hence improved trade policies and a reduction of import 
taxes and tariffs for certain sectors may benefit these cross border traders, by making reducing 
the costs they incur in cross border trade.  
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4.5.Table 6: M2 and the poverty Gap 
The dependent variable is Headcount ratio, which equals the log of the % of the population living in households with consumption or income 
per person below the poverty line of $1.25. Money and quasi money comprise the sum of currency outside the banks, demand deposits other 
than those of the central government, and the time savings, and foreign currency deposits of resident sectors other than the central 
government as a % of GDP. Net ODA equals the logarithm of the net official development assistance (ODA) as a % of GNI. Economic 
growth equals the % growth rate of real GDP per capita. Inflation is the log growth rate of the consumer prices during the sample period. 
Schooling is lagged variable of the gross enrollment ratio. Population growth (annual %) is the exponential rate of growth of midyear 
population, expressed as a percentage. Trade equals the logarithm of the share of exports plus imports relative to GDP. Remittances comprise 
the log of net personal transfers and compensation of employees from non-resident households. Political Stability reflects perceptions of the 
likelihood that the government will be destabilized. Corruption Control reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised 
for private gain. Government effectiveness is an index which reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation. The net ODA*Eco 
growth cap is the interaction term between Economic Growth and the log of net ODA. Pvt Credit*Eco growth is the interaction term between 
Economic Growth and the log of private credit. Regressions 1 - 5 = panel fixed effects (6) IV fixed effects, with robust standard errors.  
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 (1) 
Fixed Effects 
Poverty Gap 
(2) 
Fixed Effects 
Poverty Gap 
(3) 
Fixed Effects 
Poverty Gap 
(4) 
Fixed Effects 
Poverty Gap 
(5) 
Fixed Effects 
Poverty Gap 
(6) 
IV Fixed 
Effects 
Poverty Gap 
M2 -0.527 -0.626 -0.496 -0.519 -0.552 -0.690 
 (6.62)** (4.34)** (2.41)* (3.96)** (4.01)** (3.32)** 
Net ODA 0.166 0.092 0.005 0.036 0.120 0.047 
 (2.83)** (1.62) (0.08) (0.52) (2.25)* (0.85) 
Economic Growth 0.023 0.013 -0.000 0.008 0.103 0.023 
 (1.77) (2.74)** (0.00) (0.56) (1.00) (1.69) 
Inflation 0.098 -0.041 -0.044 -0.013 -0.006 -0.017 
 (3.18)** (1.12) (1.24) (0.44) (0.21) (0.35) 
Political Stability  -0.117 -0.243 -0.290 -0.271 -0.057 
  (1.75) (3.04)** (4.13)** (3.69)** (0.54) 
Trade   -0.245 -0.246 -0.249  
   (1.50) (1.96) (1.83)  
Government Expenditure   0.338 0.280 0.282  
   (1.27) (1.29) (1.21)  
Remittances   0.047 0.025 0.042  
   (1.00) (0.61) (1.09)  
L.1. School   -0.086 -0.100 -0.095  
   (2.05)* (2.90)** (2.62)*  
Population Growth    0.235 0.119  
    (2.69)* (1.03)  
Government Effect    -0.536 -0.556  
    (3.17)** (2.66)*  
Control of Corruption    0.018 0.020  
    (2.27)* (2.54)*  
Private Credit*Eco Gro     -0.009  
     (0.28)  
Net ODA*Eco Gro     -0.033  
     (2.23)*  
_cons 3.916 4.575 4.718 3.928 4.103  
(12.52)** (9.61)** (7.15)** (6.94)** (7.97)**  
R
2
  0.25 0.24 0.43 0.55 0.55 0.18 
N 
OIR 
367 194 113 113 108 148 
0.1951 
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In the above regressions all the results are similar to the regressions we run of M2 on the 
headcount the only difference of note is that, M2 seems to contribute more to poverty gap 
reduction than a reduction in the headcount. A 1% increase in M2 leads to a 0.496% to 0.69% 
decline in the poverty gap compared to a 0.364% to 0.558% decline in headcount, holding all 
other factors constant. On the other hand coefficients for net ODA are all positive, for the above 
regressions while for the regressions of M2 on headcount, the coefficients in regressions 3 and 4 
were negative. M2 is negatively and significantly related to the poverty gap.  
Intuitively, this means that financial development significantly reduces the poverty gap, 
and these results are consistent when compared to results in Tables 2-5. For the control variables, 
economic growth enters positively significant to the poverty gap implying that, the economic 
growth in this model doesn’t translate to poverty reduction in SSA. Failure for economic growth 
to translate to poverty gap reduction might be due to high inequality in income distribution. 
Interesting results to note, are the impacts of schooling on poverty gap, the results show that 
gross ratio of tertiary education enrollment, leads to significant declines in the poverty gap as 
already realized through previous regressions using private credit and the bank assets ratio as 
proxies for financial development.  
  Similar political stability leads to a reduction of the poverty gap, most likely because of 
government policy to fight poverty and improved wealth distribution. When people have 
confidence in the continuity of their government, even foreign investors are most likely to be 
attracted to such stable political environments, for long run business projects which ultimately 
benefit everyone beyond the usual elite few. Interestingly, when we interact Net ODA with 
Economic growth the results yield a negative significant impact of the interaction term on the 
poverty gap as in Table (M2 on headcount). 
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4.6.Table 7: M2 and the Headcount 
The dependent variable is Headcount ratio, which equals the log of the % of the population living in households with consumption or income 
per person below the poverty line of $1.25. Money and quasi money comprise the sum of currency outside banks, demand deposits other than 
those of the central government, and the time savings, and foreign currency deposits of resident sectors other than the central government as 
a % of gdp. Net ODA equals the logarithm of the net official development assistance (ODA) as a % of GNI. Economic growth equals the % 
growth rate of real GDP per capita. Inflation is the log growth rate of the consumer prices during the sample period. Schooling is lagged 
variable of the gross enrollment ratio. Population growth (annual %) is the exponential rate of growth of midyear population, expressed as a 
percentage. Trade equals the logarithm of the share of exports plus imports relative to GDP. Remittances comprise the log of net personal 
transfers and compensation of employees from non-resident households. Political Stability reflects perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized. Corruption Control reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain. 
Government effectiveness is an index which reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the 
degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation. The net ODA*Eco growth cap is 
the interaction term between Economic Growth and the log of net ODA. Pvt Credit*Eco growth is the interaction term between Economic 
Growth and the log of private credit. Regressions 1 - 5 = panel fixed effects, while 6= IV fixed effects with robust standard errors.  
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 (1) 
Fixed 
Effects 
Headcount 
(2) 
Fixed 
Effects 
Headcount 
(3) 
Fixed 
Effects 
Headcount 
(4) 
Fixed 
Effects 
Headcount 
(5) 
Fixed 
Effects 
Headcount 
(6) 
IV Fixed 
Effects 
Headcount 
M2 -0.364 -0.405 -0.364 -0.376 -0.378 -0.558 
 (5.22)** (4.21)** (2.50)* (3.80)** (3.94)** (4.37)** 
Net ODA 0.124 0.055 -0.029 -0.011 0.052 0.060 
 (2.86)** (1.51) (0.78) (0.27) (1.42) (1.53) 
Economic Growth 0.014 0.006 -0.001 0.004 0.088 0.016 
 (1.55) (2.27)* (0.06) (0.40) (1.17) (1.76) 
Inflation 0.043 -0.035 -0.020 -0.002 0.004 -0.047 
 (2.38)* (1.43) (1.03) (0.12) (0.21) (1.70) 
Political Stability  -0.050 -0.145 -0.176 -0.194 -0.032 
  (1.18) (3.37)** (4.36)** (4.28)** (0.62) 
Trade   -0.090 -0.092 -0.095  
   (0.82) (1.05) (1.07)  
Government Expenditure   0.243 0.207 0.237  
   (1.33) (1.47) (1.69)  
Remittances   0.034 0.021 0.032  
   (1.28) (0.93) (1.43)  
L.1. School   -0.059 -0.068 -0.067  
   (2.14)* (2.91)** (2.72)*  
Population Growth    0.144 0.115  
    (3.06)** (1.54)  
Government Effect    -0.311 -0.298  
    (2.87)** (2.21)*  
Control of Corruption    0.012 0.016  
    (2.57)* (3.20)**  
Private Credit*Eco Gro     -0.015  
     (0.71)  
Net ODA*Econ Gro     -0.022  
     (2.02)*  
_cons 4.559 4.966 4.897 4.430 4.307  
 (18.25)** (15.76)** (9.79)** (10.01)** (11.94)**  
R
2
 0.25 0.20 0.46 0.56 0.58 0.21 
N 
OIR 
367 194 113 113 108 179 
0.2116 
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These results are consistent with the previous results in which we ran regressions on bank assets 
and the headcount ratio. In these regressions we use M2 as a measure of financial development 
while we retain headcount as a proxy for poverty. In regressions 1-5, we find that M2 reduces the 
headcount significantly. This implies that a 1% increase in the M2 will lead to a reduction in the 
headcount ratio by 0.364% to 0.558%. These results are robust to heteroskedasticity as we use 
robust standard errors, and control for any serial correlation by using clustered standard errors 
for regression (6). In terms of significance these results imply a very strong relationship between 
M2 and headcount as they are valid at p<0.01 for all regressions with the exception of regression 
3, in which the results are significant at a 5% level.  
To note is the contribution of schooling, political stability, and government effectiveness 
to reducing poverty proxied by the headcount. The contribution of government expenditure, 
remittances, trade still retains insignificance to poverty alleviation, in addition to net ODA, 
economic growth and inflation. Interestingly the interaction term between net ODA and 
Economic growth in regression 5, enters significant at a 5% level to poverty alleviation by 
contribution a 0.02% decline in poverty for every 1 unit increase in the interaction term. The 
contribution of schooling to poverty reduction in the above regressions is more or less similar to 
regressions when financial development was proxied by the bank assets ratio and private credit, 
with a range of 0.059% – 0.068% decline in poverty for every 1% increase in gross tertiary 
enrollment. These results hold when assuming ceteris paribus to the other explanatory variables. 
Net ODA doesn’t reduce headcount, but when interacted with economic growth it does lead to 
significant reductions in the headcount ratio. This means that if Net ODA inflows are channeled 
towards productive sectors of the economy to the benefit of everyone, the poor will most likely 
benefit from the economic growth that follows.  
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It is quite interesting that, both Net ODA and Economic growth enter positively related to 
the headcount in regression, raising concerns of inequality and corruption, but these 2 variables 
when interacted they significantly contribute to the reduction of the headcount. The last result 
involving the interaction term is of course in line with the results of Burnside and Dollar, who 
used a much more advanced regression model, including institutional quality and policies, to 
prove that countries with a certain degree of institutional quality and policies benefit more from 
net ODA (AID) than countries with poor institutions (Burnside et Dollar 1997).
23
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion. 
                                                          
23
Burnside and Dollar 1997, AID, policies and growth, WPS 1777. 
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Hence, by using three different proxies for financial development, we find that financial 
development does have direct impacts on poverty reduction beyond the impacts of economic 
growth and the contributions of net ODA and different macro-economic and political variables. 
Through all the proxies of financial development we used we find that financial development can 
reduce the number of poor people (headcount) and also the intensity of the poverty (poverty gap). 
Furthermore, these results have a number of policy implications, in that governments can try and 
push for financial sector liberalization to attract more foreign banks with large capital bases to 
into domestic markets, not only to increase competition, but also to improve the quality of 
service delivery, while at the same time benefiting, both local investors and savers, through 
improved and affordable borrowing interest rates and reasonable interest for the savers.  
Similarly, the central banks in using the money supply, interest rates, open market rates and 
the federal funds rate can help the financial sector by determining the supply of financial services. 
Further to this the governments have to engage the civil society in educating people on financial 
matters, financial literacy is a must to any society in this present, modern and fast changing 
world we live in. Other channels to fight poverty include reforms that seek to improve the quality 
of education, at secondary education to assure continuity to tertiary level and beyond. By giving 
young people, or the general populace, good quality education the government ensures that, 
individuals are smart, employable and also have the necessary life skills to be innovative and 
start their own business ventures.  
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